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Responsibility for Crime in Cases Where the Criminal
Act Is Committed in
One Jurisdiction and Takes Effect in Another [excerpt]
After the assault on the late President
McKinley, and during the time it was thought he would recover, the
question as to whether there was any possible way of punishing Czolgosz
other than by the comparatively mild sentence of ten years’ imprisonment
under the New York Penal Code, was discussed. Provided it could
be proved that two or more were involved in the plot to murder the
President, some thought that sections 5508 and 5509 of the Federal
statutes might apply. These sections are in a chapter entitled “Crimes
Against the [433][434] Elective Franchise
and Civil Rights of Citizens.” Section 5508 provides that two or
more persons who conspire to injure any citizen in the free exercise
or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the constitution
or laws of the United States, shall be fined not more than $5,000
and imprisoned for not more than ten years. Section 5509 provides
that if in the violation of the previous provisions any crime is
committed the offenders shall be punished in addition to the same
extent as they are punishable in the state where the act is committed.
Granting that the presidency is a
right or privilege secured by the constitution, and that the attack
was against Mr. McKinley as President and not against him as a man,
it seems that Czolgosz and his supposed conspirators would have
brought themselves within the provisions of this statute. There
would have been also the specific and distinct crime of an assault,
an offense against the peace of the State of New York. The dignity
of two jurisdictions would have been offended and both could have
punished. New York could not have tried him after a Federal conviction
(Penal Code, supra), but we know nothing to prevent a New
York conviction followed by a Federal conviction. This would have
made a total punishment of thirty years’ imprisonment, with a $5,000
fine. For ordinary assaults this seems harsh, and would not be applied.
We quote the words of Justice Daniel¹ in Fox. v. The State
of Ohio: “It is almost certain, that in the benignant spirit in
which the institutions both of the State and Federal systems are
administered, an offender who should have suffered the penalties
denounced by the one would not be subjected a second time to punishment
by the other for acts essentially the same, unless indeed, this
might occur in instances of peculiar enormity or where the public
safety demanded extraordinary vigor.”
This, of course, is now an academic
question, as the assassin has received the utmost penalties of the
law.
¹.
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