Publication information |
Source: Boston Evening Transcript Source type: newspaper Document type: editorial Document title: “Mr. Hanna’s ‘If’” Author(s): anonymous City of publication: Boston, Massachusetts Date of publication: 24 September 1901 Volume number: none Issue number: none Pagination: 8 |
Citation |
“Mr. Hanna’s ‘If.’” Boston Evening Transcript 24 Sept. 1901: p. 8. |
Transcription |
full text |
Keywords |
Marcus Hanna (public statements); Roosevelt presidency (predictions, expectations, etc.); Theodore Roosevelt (relations with Marcus Hanna); William McKinley (relations with Marcus Hanna); the press (criticism); Theodore Roosevelt (assumption of presidency: public response); Henry Cabot Lodge. |
Named persons |
J. Edward Addicks; Marcus Hanna; Henry Cabot Lodge; William McKinley; Matthew S. Quay; Theodore Roosevelt. |
Document |
Mr. Hanna’s “If”
Senator Hanna is quoted as saying that if President
Roosevelt carries out his promise to continue the policy adopted by President
McKinley he will have his warm support as well as that of every other loyal
Republican. This seems to us one of those safe commonplaces which might be expected
of Senator Hanna under the circumstances, but we observe already a tendency
to emphasize the “if,” as suggestive of Mr. Hanna’s contemplating the probability
of a break between him and the Administration. This tendency to force this conclusion
from a few commonplace phrases reflects a misunderstanding of Senator Hanna’s
position with the late President.
Senator Hanna had unquestionably great influence
with President McKinley. The two men were warm personal friends and long had
been. There was a real affection between them. Each justly valued the other.
The disposition the President had to give great weight to the opinions of his
old friend and counsellor [sic] was unquestionably strengthened by the latter’s
position as chairman of the National Republican Committee, in which capacity
Mr. Hanna had directed. President McKinley earnestly desired to see harmony
in the Republican party. He had likings and dislikes very clearly defined in
his own mind for certain of its prominent men, but he frequently subordinated
his own feelings to the accomplishment of the end he sought.
Thus neither the President nor Mr. Hanna had any
liking for Quay or Quayism, but the White House remained neutral between the
two elements of the Pennsylvania Repub[l]icans. Nor would the President be dragged
into the Delaware senatorial struggle. Addicks’s leaders in the last heated
hours at Dover last March openly blamed the President for the continuance of
the deadlock, saying that his silence towards them occasioned it and asserting
that they had Mr. Hanna’s support and good wishes. There is reason to believe
that on other occasions the President heard Mr. Hanna with close and courteous
attention and then took the way that his own calmer temperament and clearer
vision suggested. Thus the President undoubtedly favored a system of Federal
aid for ship-building, but whether the Hanna bill recommended isself [sic] to
his judgment in all its details remains a question to this day. He certainly
did not appear to be strenuous in its behalf, and no one could have known better
that there was by no means Republican solid support for it.
Senator Hanna was, indeed, a man of great weight
at the White House; but the conception of him formed by many papers and a considerable
element of the public as the boss whose decrees President McKinley simply registered
was utterly wrong and did great injustice both to Mr. Hanna and President McKinley.
Under President Roosevelt, Mr. Hanna becomes a senator from Ohio and chairman
of the Republican committee. He cannot expect to stand to President Roosevelt
in relations approaching those he held towards President McKinley—his long-time
friend and valued adviser. But personal and public friendly relations between
the two will in all probability be maintained. Each is strenuous in his way,
but each is able, and each may and probably will realize the value of consideration
for the other.
Mr. Hanna could gain little and lose much by antagonizing
President Roosevelt. President Roosevelt, fully according to Mr. Hanna the public
consideration to which his ability and position entitle him, would still have
to avoid even the appearance of subjection to the will of the Ohio senator.
It will be time enough for the Republican party to cross a bridge of Roosevelt-Hanna
difficulty when it comes to it, if it ever does.
The public impression that a party leader bosses
the President is in large measure due to the bad judgment of a certain element
of newspaper correspondents who have their favorite personalities and favorite
theories. Scarcely had President Roosevelt taken the oath of office before a
number of Washington correspondents provided a boss for him. These gentlemen
unanimously resolved that if Mr. Lodge did not at once accept the position of
secretary of state, which they were all sure the President would immediately
offer him, it would [b]e because he preferred to remain in the Senate and “shape
the policy of the Administration.” Now President Roosevelt and Senator Lodge
are warm personal and political friends. But no one questions that there are
limits to friendship and there is a decorum to friendship which two such men
may be trusted to respect. President Roosevelt will be his own boss. The assumption
that he will be the mask of Senator Lodge does gross injustice to him and to
Senator Lodge, too.