Theodore Roosevelt
A
who has studied the character of the Emperor of Germany and the
character of the President of the United States must be struck by
the resemblance that exists between these two leading actors on
the stage of great affairs to-day. They are wonderfully alike in
a great many things—in their superabundant vitality, their fearlessness,
their seeming disregard for public opinion, and their many-sidedness.
William of Germany knows much of statecraft, the army and navy,
and politics, and not a little of art, science, and literature.
President Roosevelt knows politics, books, and what many readers
of many books never learn—men; his knowledge of military affairs
is more comprehensive than most people give him credit for, as he
has studied the art of war from the best writers of the science;
and he has the knowledge of naval affairs that comes from having
been at the head of the Navy Department when the roar of great guns
wrote the only page in modern naval history.
There is another striking similarity
between the two men. William of Prussia came to the throne as the
successor of two men in whom all the world had confidence—men who
stood for all that was wise, cautious, and lovable. His grandfather
had died crowned by the aureole of success, having created a nation,
and having emerged victorious from a campaign that amazed the world.
His successor was young, virile, hasty, untrained in statecraft,
intolerant of counsel, heedless of advice. He believed in himself
and in his country, whose magnificent resources the world was then
dimly beginning to appreciate. President Roosevelt, on his part,
succeeds a man whom the world had learned to regard as [259][260]
very wise, very cautious, and very gentle in his methods of government.
President McKinley, like the first German Emperor, had turned the
eyes of all the world on his country by its military achievements.
The world had recognized the United States as a great factor in
the economic equation; the war with Spain made it understand that
here was a power with such tremendous latent military possibilities
that, if it cared to exert them, it could swing the balance as it
chose. Not only had the United States money and resources; it had
something more, that something without which money is valueless;
it had the men, men who had shown their courage and intelligence,
who had fought as well on land as on sea.
Mr. Roosevelt, like William, suffered
at first from comparison. When President McKinley died there was
a moment of fear. We can look back now and see how groundless were
our fears; but at the moment they appeared very real. Wisdom was
to give place to inexperience, caution to rashness, peace to war.
The war with Spain had brought the United States into the front
rank of the great powers, and here was a man suddenly placed at
the head of affairs who, like his royal brother of Germany, believed
in the sword, and longed for the opportunity to show how finely
tempered was the blade. No wonder the world waited for what was
next to happen.
The world is always looking for the
dramatic. It forgets dialogue, but always remembers a tableau. The
colonel of the Rough Riders, watching his men take their baptism
of blood at Las Guasimas, leading them up San Juan hill, sharing
with them the privations of the trenches in front of Santiago—that
was the vivid picture people could remember of Theodore Roosevelt.
They forgot that with him war was merely an incident. For a few
months he had worn khaki because he had conceived it his duty to
offer his sword to his country; and with that adaptability which
is the sixth sense possessed by Americans, he had gone about his
business of soldiering as naturally as if it were the only business
he knew. But the public forgot that against his few months of military
experience were the years he had spent in learning life, in studying
men and affairs, and in fitting himself for government by reading
and writing history. Roosevelt, the man on horseback, the beau ideal
of the cavalry commander, a dashing, superb figure, one that would
have delighted the heart of Carlyle, was real and vivid enough to
catch the emotional crowd. Roosevelt the essayist, the biographer
of Benton and Morris, the historian of the West; Roosevelt who had
waged war against Tammany, who had taken a corrupt, inefficient,
and brutal police force and had taught it honesty, efficiency, and
decency; who had courageously made the [260][261]
civil service law a thing to be respected instead of a thing to
be mocked at by designing politicians—this was the dialogue of the
play, to be forgotten before the act was over; but the climax, the
Man on Horseback, was to be remembered long after the curtain went
down.
Once again draw the parallel between
the German Emperor and the President. When William II came to the
throne, one of the first things he did was to dismiss his old and
tried Chancellor as indifferently as any other servant who has outlived
his usefulness. William dropped his pilot overboard when all the
world thought that never did ship of state need an experienced pilot
so much as did Germany at that moment. It was his announcement to
the world that he was his own master. It was the audacity of genius
or the sublimity of ignorance, and no one then knew exactly which.
Everyone knows now. The firebrand that was to set all Europe ablaze
has more than once quenched the flame, and his great political sagacity
is now generally admitted. Mr. Roosevelt, confronted with an equally
grave emergency, forced to act almost on the spur of the moment,
showed the same courage and the same wisdom.
The policy of McKinley had been accepted
and endorsed by the country. Under that policy there had been prosperity
and contentment: the United States was happy at home and respected
abroad. Mr. Roosevelt made that policy how own; he made the men
who had helped to construct that policy as the advisers of President
McKinley his own advisers. This step showed not only wisdom, but
courage and confidence in himself. A foolish man would have been
indifferent to the delicate balance on which at that moment hinged
commercial solvency, and would have tipped the scale by justifying
the worst fears of the pessimistic; a timid man would have hesitated,
temporized, sought counsel, and swung with the latest current of
advice from selfish and interested counsellors; a man who mistrusted
himself would have feared the inevitable comparison in the eyes
of the cabinet between McKinley and himself; and the cabinet, being
so close to the President, would have the best opportunity to weigh
the living against the dead. That he did not hesitate, that at the
most critical moment of his life he acted with decision and wisdom,
and that he showed himself willing to accept counsel were the highest
proofs he could give to the country of his sincerity, his prudence,
and his understanding of the responsibilities which had come to
him when he took the oath of office as President of the United States.
A few words removed all doubts. Fears
were dissipated. Men trembled no longer. The pulse of commerce,
that for a moment had [261][262] been
interrupted, resumed its normal beat, rhythmically registering the
steady flow of capital through the arteries of business. The United
States, a young giant for the moment dazed, was as sound, as healthy,
as vigorous, as full of courage and ambition as ever. The morrow
could be faced with hope and serenity.
The man of action, the man who does
things rather than talk about them; who has courage, determination,
and that tenacity of purpose which is a more valuable quality than
genius; and, above all, who has character, who creates an ideal
and clings to it—such a man is generally set down by his fellows
as being impetuous, hasty, ill-balanced, intractable, in short,
a dangerous man to place in a position of responsibility, because
he is usually misunderstood. His enemies have never been able to
accuse President Roosevelt of dishonesty, of petty methods, of unworthy
practices; they could not charge him with being unlettered or narrow;
there is no blemish on his private or public life. But they could
dub him impetuous; which is a convenient but intangible charge,
and requires no specification. Under analysis the accusation resolves
itself into this: when he has considered it necessary to correct
an abuse, when as a public officer, having a public duty to perform,
he has deemed it essential to fight, he has never hesitated about
taking the offensive. But he has always fought fairly. In the words
of his intimate friend and warm admirer Jacob Riis, he has never
“struck below the belt. In the Governor’s chair afterward he gave
the politicians whom he fought, and who fought him, the same terms.
They tried their best to upset him, for they had nothing to expect
from him. But they knew and owned that he fought fair. Their backs
were secure. He never tricked them to gain an advantage. A promise
given by him was always kept to the letter.” It is that quality
of fairness that has won him the respect of his enemies. Even while
they feared and disliked him, they were forced to admit that he
would take no unworthy advantage.
Run over his career and you notice
at once how dangerously impetuous he has been. Typical of this “impetuosity”
is the round robin he signed which was sent to the War Department.
Santiago had fallen; there was no necessity for maintaining a large
force in Cuba; and yet the flower of the American army, Shafter’s
army corps, was in the trenches before Santiago, with yellow fever
hideously grinning at them. Red tape and bureaucracy were responsible.
Roosevelt wanted to preserve the lives of his men, and there were
two ways to do it. One was to send them to Porto Rico, for which
everyone was anxious; the other was, if their services were not
needed in Porto Rico, to send them home. [262][263]
Washington pottered and dawdled and talked; Roosevelt acted. The
troops were sent home.
Another instance of his “impulsiveness”
was when he wrote to the Secretary of War urging that the Rough
Riders be sent to Porto Rico rather than that volunteers, because
his regiment was “as good as any regulars, and three times as good
as any state troops,” who, he pointed out, “were armed with black
powder, Springfields, or other archaic weapons.” Malice thought
there was a chance to injure him, and this letter was published
in the hope that it would prejudice the volunteers against Roosevelt
and damage him politically. No harm was done; on the contrary, the
country liked this kind of plain talk, and agreed with him that
it was folly to send troops armed with Springfields burning black
powder against Spaniards armed with Mausers and smokeless powder,
especially when the Rough Riders, well armed and thoroughly efficient,
were eating out their hearts in disappointment because they were
not permitted to take part in the campaign.
When he was elected Governor of New
York his best friends feared that his impulsiveness would cause
him to clash with the politicians, while his enemies were so sure
that he would quarrel with everyone before he had been in the executive
mansion six weeks that they scarcely took the pains to disguise
their joy. As Governor he was a very “dangerous” man—dangerous to
the politicians who looked upon the public service as something
to be exploited for their own benefit. His “impulsiveness” in reforming
the administration of the canals, in enforcing the merit system,
and in securing the passage of a law taxing franchises proved how
dangerous it is to put an impetuous man in a position of public
responsibility: yet the people of the State of New York exhibited
no undue alarm. The passage of the franchise act is typical of the
man. The corporations strenuously resisted it because it made them
bear their share of taxation, and they used all their political
influence to induce the Governor not to press the matter. The Republican
leaders warned him of the political danger he ran by incurring the
hostility of great financial interests. He was uninfluenced by all
this clamor; he refused to be swerved because he was threatened.
But while he lived up to high principles he did not sacrifice himself.
He made some enemies—no man can be Governor of New York and not
make enemies—but he did not antagonize his party or drive from his
side the men who were influential in party councils. He maintained
his independence and showed that he possessed a natural quality
of leadership.
Why President Roosevelt should be
regarded as an impetuous man [263][264]
is, I confess, somewhat of a mystery to me. I have had some little
opportunity of seeing him under various circumstances, and of judging
whether he has acted hastily or simply with determination because
he has the courage of his convictions. But one thing should not
be forgotten, and that is the influence of blood, the strongest
influence in forming a man’s character and controlling his actions.
He has in his veins the blood of a long line of Dutch ancestors,
a race noted rather for their phlegm than for their impetuosity.
He has the American vitality, initiative, and resourcefulness, tempered
by Dutch caution; in him congenital traits are strongly marked.
He is an idealist and yet intensely practical; both characteristics
denoting his Dutch ancestry. The love of home and of family, the
devotion to religion, the clinging with passionate vehemence to
an ideal, combined with much good common sense, distinguish the
Teutonic races from the Latins, whose emotions, easily aroused,
are equally evanescent. The foundation of the President’s character
rests on this substratum of Dutch caution, a very solid foundation,
on which has been builded the superstructure of American thought
and American influence, which give the American the nervous energy
that makes him enough like the other English-speaking peoples to
emphasize the difference. This practical side of his nature is shown
by the fact that he has done things—done them in the very thick
of the fray. As he said to a friend, who expressed surprise that
he should give up literary work to reform the police department
of New York: “I thought the storm centre was in New York, and so
I came here. It is a great piece of practical work. I like to take
hold of work that has been done by a Tammany leader and do it as
well, only by approaching it from an opposite direction. A thing
that attracted me to it was that it was to be done in the hurly-burly,
for I don’t like cloister life.” No, decidedly, Mr. Roosevelt is
not the man to meditate in a monastery when there is work to be
done in the world.
The White House exercises a restraining
influence upon its occupant. Every man who has sat in the chair
of Washington has grown to the measure of his responsibilities.
No man has left the White House who has not broadened; whose horizon
has not been widened; who has not taken a more philosophic view
of life; who has not come to understand, if he never understood
it before, that nations have their obligations to other nations
exactly as individuals have their obligations to society. The presidency
has always left its impress upon the President. No man is exactly
the same after being President as he was before he was elected;
nor can anyone wonder at it. President Roosevelt, with all his vitality,
[264][265] his cyclopean power of work,
and his overflowing good spirits slightly tinged with a cynicism
which makes him estimate both praise and criticism at about their
true value, will not pass unscathed through the severest test that
can be applied to any man. When he leaves the White House he will
be graver and more sedate than he is to-day.
Although the youngest President, Mr.
Roosevelt has a more comprehensive and intimate knowledge of the
country than had any of his predecessors. It is somewhat remarkable
that although Americans are a nation of travellers, although most
Americans know from personal observation a great deal of their own
country, the majority of Presidents have spent their lives, prior
to their election, in the section of the country in which they had
their homes; and the number who have known anything of foreign countries
can, I believe, be counted upon the fingers of one’s hands. President
Roosevelt is the notable exception. A man from the East, his birth
and position entitling him to admission to the best in its society,
he knows the West as only men can know it who have lived there and
come into intimate contact with its people. There is no section
of the country that the President does not know; there is no class,
from cow punchers to savants, among whom he has not his friends.
He has seen much of Europe; he has travelled there and met its people;
and he is no stranger to their ideas. He is one of the very few
Presidents possessing a proficient knowledge of foreign languages.
He is the only President who served an apprenticeship in one of
the great departments. There have been men who went to the White
House from the head of an Executive Department, but I do not now
recall the case of an Assistant Secretary becoming President. His
years of service as a Civil Service Commissioner and later as Assistant
Secretary of the Navy have given him a knowledge of the minutiæ
of departmental affairs which will be of the greatest value to him
now. The advantage which some of his predecessors possessed of having
had experience in the House or Senate, and understanding from actual
observation the idiosyncrasies of Congress, has been denied him.
Congress is the malignant influence
in his horoscope. I venture the prediction that if President Roosevelt
has trouble it will be caused by the Senate and not by the people.
The Senate has gradually enlarged its powers until it has come to
regard itself as a council of state as well as a legislative body,
and in its capacity as a council of state seeks to control the actions
of the Executive. Since the Senate has pronounced obsolete the doctrine
that it has no greater powers than those vested in the House of
Representatives, the relations between the Senate and the [265][266]
President have not always been of the most intimate character. In
fact, it can be said that during the last twenty years Mr. McKinley
was the only President who never had any friction with the Senate.
But Mr. McKinley had a peculiar genius for managing men, and a subtle
tact in dealing with the Senate. He was such an accomplished diplomatist
that he was able to avoid all clashing, principally because he was
content not to try to force any line of policy to which the Senate
objected. An instance of this was his skill in not taking issue
with the Senate on the question of reciprocity. Although he believed
in the wisdom of reciprocity, as his memorable speech at Buffalo
showed, and refused to permit Mr. Kasson, the special reciprocity
commissioner, to resign when the Senate refused to ratify the treaties
which he had negotiated, he made no effort to secure the ratification
of those treaties when the Senate refused to consider them. A man
with less finesse or more obstinacy, who held himself in
less careful restraint or was more indifferent about preserving
the most cordial relations with the Senate, would have forced the
issue, which would probably have led to a rupture with the leaders
of his party in the Senate. Mr. McKinley had the additional advantage,
possessed by no President in recent years, of having the confidence
of the Senate, which had the highest respect for his wisdom and
caution, and for the ability he had shown in the management of the
war and of the great issues that followed.
Mr. McKinley could do many things
that President Roosevelt cannot do. Age was in favor of the late
President. The leaders of the Senate are men well advanced in years,
and they accepted from a man of their own age advice which they
will not accept from one who is their junior. Mr. Roosevelt will
not be so docile as Mr. McKinley. Mr. Roosevelt will, of course,
take counsel with the Republican leaders in the Senate; he will
endeavor to secure their support for the policy which he advocates;
he will make every effort to maintain the most friendly relations
with them; but if the Senate attempts to interfere with the prerogatives
of the President or to overstep the constitutional line dividing
the legislative from the executive, the President will not be the
first to yield. It is not in the nature of the man to do so. If
a thing is to be done, and he believes it to be right, he will do
it, and he will be indifferent as to what the Senate may think about
it. There is a good deal of the Andrew Jackson about him; and if
he should read the Senate a lecture, as Jackson did, it would not
be surprising.
President Roosevelt’s administration
will be an interesting one, and not the least interesting feature
will be the relations between him and [266][267]
the Senate. That the Senate will endeavor to extend its power, to
increase its influence, and to continue to be the dominant force
in the government, no one who knows the Senate and the men who control
it, or who has narrowly watched its course during the last few years,
can for one moment doubt. Mr. Roosevelt will not be content with
being merely the agent to execute the decrees of the Senate. He
will respect it and he will treat it with the consideration that
properly belongs to it under the Constitution; but he will also
exact from it the constitutional deference that the Senate owes
to the Executive. If he does not, if he surrenders to the Senate,
if he is content with being merely its agent and allowing it to
shape his policy to suit its views, one will be surprised and, perhaps,
not a little disappointed. This will be the great test of his character,
the proof whether he is the impetuous man some people have imagined,
or whether he is the determined, positive, courageous man some of
his friends believe him to be—cool enough to do nothing rash, tactful
enough to yield non-essentials when concession is necessary, wise
enough to understand human nature and mould it to his own purpose.
Many Presidents have had a “kitchen
cabinet ” which has been more powerful than the regular cabinet;
most Presidents have had an intimate friend who, according to popular
belief, has been the real power in the White House. People have
asked who is to be the premier of the kitchen cabinet or the Warwick
of the administration. The answer can be readily given. His name
is Theodore Roosevelt.
|