The Anarchist and His Victim
There has been nothing worse in
the annals of political assassination than the attempt on the life
of President McKinley. Politically, the crime is almost more motiveless
than the murder of the late King of Italy, or even the last President
of the French Republic. A crowned head is hateful by instinct and
tradition to a certain class of political fanatic, and a French
President is also the representative of political ideas which are
repugnant to more than one fiercely antagonistic section of his
countrymen. But an American President occupies his post with the
assent and approval of the whole nation. Whatever differences may
surround his election, once elected he is acknowledged by all parties
as the head of the State. In that capacity he is regarded with a
feeling of loyalty akin to that which we entertain for our Sovereign,
and probably more universal because it is less personal. And Mr.
McKinley has gained in an eminent degree the admiration and affection
of his countrymen. He has written his name large on the history
of the Republic. He is the author of a commercial policy which,
whatever we on this side may think about it, has brought unprecedented
prosperity to the country and placed it at the head of the nations
of the world in industrial and commercial progress. He has carried
out successfully a war with a European Power of which his country
has every reason to be proud, and, whether for good or evil, he
has taken the first step in the establishment of an American dominion
across the seas. Like every American President, he is a man of irreproachable
life and character, and it is not likely that he has ever made a
personal enemy, either in private or public life. That such a man
should be selected as the victim of a foul and dastardly murder
must excite horror among all sorts and conditions of men throughout
the world. The author of such an act can only excite feelings of
execration, and one sympathises involuntarily with the American
crowd which did its best to lynch him in defiance of the law.
The repetition of crimes of this class—one
of the ugliest features of modern civilisation—prompts on all sides
the question, What can be done to suppress them? The question is
a most difficult one, because the criminal act has its origin in
impulses totally different from all others to restrain which laws
are made. Occasionally, of course, political assassinations are
merely particular instances of homicidal mania. The maniac must
kill somebody, and his victim is selected merely because he happens
to be a prominent individual whose personality has impressed the
mind of the lunatic and set it working against him. Occasionally
the act is prompted by a morbid craving for notoriety and distinction,
not materially different from insanity. It is no more possible [659][660]
to prevent crimes of this class than to prevent any private individual
from being attacked by a madman—or, for the matter of that, by a
mad bull. There are also political assassinations which are prompted
by the desire to overturn a dynasty or a government, and from the
days of Harmodius and Aristogeiton or Brutus and Cassius downwards
such deeds have been regarded rather as acts of war than ordinary
crimes. When the end has been gained it has generally been held
to justify the means, and the author has gone down to posterity
as a hero. When the act, or the attempt, has not led to any practical
result, the author has paid the penalty in the ordinary course.
It is the business of rulers and Governments to secure themselves
against such violent measures, either by avoiding the provocation
of such desperate hostility among their subjects, or by fortifying
themselves securely through their soldiers and policemen. As long
as the success of the attempt is doubtful and the penalty certain,
only intolerable political grievances or a degree of partisan fanaticism
hardly distinguishable from insanity will prompt a man to risk his
own life in the attempt to remove an obnoxious ruler.
But when we come to the Anarchist
the circumstances are somewhat different. The motive which prompts
assassination in this case is not antipathy to a particular ruler
or a particular form of government, but hostility to all government
in every shape. It matters not to the assassin whether his victim
is an hereditary monarch or an elected President of a Republic.
It matters not whether he is a monster of political iniquity or
a wise and enlightened statesman holding office by the will of the
whole community. He is the representative of organised law and government,
and as such he is doomed to death. It is quite true that the state
of mind which impels a man to murder under such circumstances, with
the moral certainty that his own death will be the consequence,
and without the slightest probability that the existing social and
political order of things will be in the least affected by the result,
looks uncommonly like insanity once again. I dare say that the expert
in mental science would find little difference between the mental
condition of the lunatic who fired at Queen Victoria under an imaginary
sense of personal grievance, or the crack-brained youth Sipido,
who made his attempt on our present King, and the Anarchist who
has shot Mr. McKinley in the belief that he was discharging a duty
to humanity. But there is one difference which is of some consequence
in practice. It is that Czolgosz, or whatever his name is, is the
representative of a propaganda which is being carried on actively
in all countries. Whether or not it be true, as he asserts in the
confession that has been published, that he was inspired to his
crime by one particular lecture which he heard delivered by a lady,
it is quite certain that his crime is the result of definite and
systematic teaching acting on a mind predisposed, for one reason
or another, to put such teaching into practice. No one is more averse
than I am to any restriction on legitimate liberty of opinion. Whether
a man be a Socialist or an Individualist, a Royalist or a Republican,
whether his views be moderate or extreme, he has a right to hold
them. On the other hand, if the State believes that the expression
and propagation of his views endanger its safety, it clearly has
a right to silence him, though it may not be expedient to use that
right. There are laws in this country which can be put in force
against those who propagate sedition; and in most countries there
are still stronger laws on this point, and still less scruple about
using them. When it comes to the preaching of doctrines designed
to destroy organised society altogether, and inconsistent with the
maintenance of government in any shape, it is clear that society
has the right to defend itself against such doctrines, if it thinks
fit. The day may come yet when it will be a question whether the
Anarchists are to destroy society or whether society is to destroy
the Anarchists. I do not think that that day is very near; and measures
designed to repress freedom of opinion in any shape must always
be used with the greatest caution, for they are apt to have an effect
precisely opposite to what is intended. But to systematically inculcate
the advisability of exterminating persons connected with the Government,
or even to enunciate vague general principles which may lead any
crack-brained enthusiast who imbibes them to the conclusion that
he will benefit humanity by shooting the first public official he
comes across, whether a policeman or a Republican President, is
clearly a crime in itself, and must be dealt with as such if it
assumes serious dimensions. At the same time do not let us forget
that Anarchism is a disease, and that the most effectual mode of
dealing with it, like other diseases, is to remove the unhealthy
conditions from which it springs.
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